Wednesday 6 June 2012

Special guest in town (Hillary Clinton in Pakistan)

US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton paid her most important visit to Pakistan so far. It had three purposes: it not only proved to be another one of the measures to bring Pakistan within the ambit of American diplomacy, it also proved to be a preparatory visit for President Barack Obama’s expected visit towards the end of the year, as well as an opportunity to prove its imperial hegemony in the region.
Indeed, its hegemony was shown by the signing of the minutes of negotiation with Afghanistan on the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement in the presence of Secretary Clinton. The agreement has not been reached, but negotiations have taken place.
Normally, the signing of the agreement itself would be the occasion for a ceremony, but even that would not have a foreign dignitary witnessing it.
However, the US was represented by its Secretary of State because Afghanistan is under its occupation, and it does not make any agreements without American approval.
This was made possible by Pakistan’s acceptance of this hegemony, and by its allowing, or rather welcoming of the American presence. This made the signing, which took place at roughly the time that an agreement should have been reached, a cosy all-American affair, between one country which is under actual American occupation, and another which is under its financial and political tutelage, which together add up to a region which the US controls.
Pakistan is trying to resist on two counts. First, it is trying to obtain a civilian nuclear agreement with China. And in the Afghan transit trade, it is trying to refuse to give to India a route over it to Afghanistan.
The US is trying to stop the deal for reactors with China, even though it had entered into a similar deal with India. Pakistan turned to China only after it was rebuffed by the US, but America has hauled China before the Nuclear Suppliers Group on this count. Pakistan’s energy shortages have lent an edge to its attempts to get a nuclear deal, and this is an area in which the US has pledged to help, but without any firm commitment.
The reason it is refusing a land route to India for Afghanistan is paradoxically the same as why the US wants that route conceded. It is refusing to accept Indian hegemony over the region, which the US wants to see established in preparation for the time when India, equipped with the great-power status it has desperately sought ever since independence, can act as its policeman in the region.
Also reflective of American imperial concerns is how the Secretary stepped into the issue of General Kayani’s extension as Pakistani COAS. Normally, such manoeuvring is done behind closed doors, but the Secretary’s recommendation was very public, and deliberately so.
If the extension is given, it will be seen as an American decision, and will correspondingly reflect on the civilian government. However, if the civilian government chooses a replacement, the US will also be OK with that. Either way, the US will have established its veto power over top appointments in the military. As the military already does not think much of civilians, it will accept this message.
As for the agreement, the question of the Indian overland route has not been left alone, but may be raised again. As the agreement is to be a long-term one, question may arise again over its life, and if Pakistan stays committed to the relationship, will surely be raised again, and probably be decided in favour of India.
It would lead to the smuggling of Indian goods into Pakistan, and thus the claim that a large Pakistani business lobby is in favour of formalising the import by making the trade legal. India wants to have all the advantages of good relations with Pakistan without going to the trouble of solving any of its problems with it, the most obvious being the core dispute of Kashmir.
This all took place as the immediate prelude to the Kabul Conference, and thus was part of the USA’s AfPak policy, which views this as a single region deserving a single policy. However, though it may be acceptable to the rulers in Islamabad to be lumped with Afghanistan, this approach ignores the reality that Pakistan has concerns of its own which must be addressed.
While it may be acceptable to Kabul, and to the rulers in Islamabad, for regional hegemony to be given to India, it would not find acceptance among the people of Pakistan, no matter how neat or convenient the US might find it.
The strategic dialogue mechanism has overshadowed traditional diplomacy because the US espouses it, but it should be kept in mind that China has adopted the method, and one of its earliest partners has been Pakistan, and civilian nuclear cooperation has been one of the subjects.
The aid which Secretary Clinton trumpeted so much was ‘old aid’, already approved by Congress, and thus Secretary Clinton not only did not bring anything new, but she also failed to fulfil any of the promises made by the US, like the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones for the tribal areas or Pakistan’s energy needs.
With the dialogue failing to deliver on those issues, and also on changing US positions on issues involving India, not just its main partner in the region, but also its main hope, it does not seem to have served a particularly useful purpose for Pakistan.
Perhaps, the most important subject for both sides was the visit to Pakistan by President Barack Obama. The Secretary’s visit is often the substitute for a presidential visit, but the visit itself will depend on India, for President Obama will not visit Pakistan alone, but will make a swing through the region which will include India and Afghanistan, and may even include Central Asia, provided the USSR does not object.
However, it should be encouraging that Obama is willing to visit the region in an election year, for both his predecessors, including Ms Clinton’s husband, deferred their subcontinental visits until their second terms, something which it is not at all clear that Obama will get.
While that will reduce the effectiveness of his visits, it does not reduce the risk that he will repeat the charge flung by Ms Clinton while here, that the terrorist leadership, notably Osama Bin Laden, was in Pakistan.
This charge, linking Pakistan to terror, is primarily a piece of Indian propaganda, which some circles in the US choose to repeat not because it is true, but because it helps distract attention from the USA’s failure in Afghanistan. Since Ms Clinton will be briefing him, her beliefs will be crucial.
However, Pakistan can probably take comfort from the fact thus revealed, that Pakistan still matters in the American scheme of things.
The mere visit by a US President is, under the circumstances, well worth sacrificing, by refusing to toe the imperial American line. However, the ability of the present ruling class to give up the contact, even if brief, with the mystique attached to the US President’s office, even if bruised, is probably not something to depend on.

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